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Highlights 
 
 One reason why Scandinavia today holds high social trust scores could be due to the region’s 
long-distance trade practices during the Viking age. 
 Trade between strangers in an oral world requires a strong informal institution of trust-based 
trade norms out of necessity to manage the risk of being cheated.  
 In contrast to similar cases like the medieval Maghribi traders who counted on writing, in the 
non-literate Viking world, the formal punishment of cheaters could not be supported by 
written documents. 
 If a trader did not keep his word, social sanctioning by word of mouth was most likely the 
only method to discipline the cheater and prevent future free-rider behavior.  
 The early rise of trust-based trade norms in Scandinavia is an overlooked factor in the region’s 
long-term socio-economic development. 
 One policy option for poor countries with high non-literacy rates would be to eliminate all 
sorts of trade restrictions to strengthen both free trade and social trust. 
 
 
Abstract 
As the saying goes, “it takes years to build up trust and only seconds to destroy it.” In this 
paper, we argue that this is indeed the case when explaining trust formation in Scandinavia. Hence, 
in an attempt to explain why the Scandinavian welfare states hold the highest social trust scores in 
the world today, we argue that one possible historical root of social trust may be the long-distance 
trade practices of the Viking age. To manage the risk of being cheated, trade between strangers in 
an oral world required a strong informal institution of trust-based trade norms out of necessity to 
deal with the risk of being cheated. In contrast to similar cases like the famous medieval Maghribi 
traders, who counted on writing (Greif, 1989), the punishment of cheaters could not be supported by 
written documents such as legal documents and letters, as the large majority of Vikings were non-
literate. If a trader did not keep his word, social sanctioning by word of mouth was most likely the 
only method to discipline the cheater and prevent future free-rider behavior. The early rise of trust-
based trade norms in Scandinavia is an overlooked factor in the region’s long-term socio-economic 
development and social trust accumulation. This result points to the importance of free trade today, 
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especially in poor countries with low levels of economic development and high rates of non-
literacy. 
 
JEL classification: F1, F43, O35, O43, O50, N73 
Keywords: Long-distance trade, Trade norms, Social trust, Viking age, Scandinavia, Informal 
institutions, Oral culture, Ting legal system, Long-run socio-economic development 
 
1. Introduction 
International surveys show that Nordic populations are the most trusting people in the world. 
While the average percentage of people answering the question “can most people be trusted?” in the 
positive is below 30, the three Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden hold an 
average of more than 60 percent, which makes them the most trusting nations in the world 
(Svendsen and Svendsen, 2016a). High trust towards strangers ‒ otherwise referred to as social or 
generalized trust ‒ correlates well with economic performance, low corruption, effective 
government, social integration and subjective well-being (e.g., Putnam, 1993, 2000; Uslaner, 2002, 
2009; Bjørnskov, 2006, 2009; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000; Özcan and Bjørnskov, 2011).  
However, why are Nordic populations with Viking heritage so trusting compared to the rest 
of the world? The purpose of this paper is to provide an answer by tracing social trust back in time 
through path dependency. As the literature shows, there are a variety of explanations for the uneven 
cross-country distribution of social trust (see, e.g., Ostrom and Ahn, 2009; Nannestad, 2008). One 
widespread explanation has been the rich tradition of civic engagement, including voluntary 
associations (Putnam, 1993; Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004, 2016b). Other explanations include the 
impact of socialization (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2007), culture (e.g., Uslaner, 2002), religion (e.g., 
Delhey and Newton, 2005; Weber, 2009), and the quality of state institutions (e.g., Rothstein, 2005, 
2009). Not least, the beneficial effects of welfare state institutions have been stressed. Indeed, as 
suggested by Bo Rothstein and others, in the case of Scandinavian countries the high levels of 
social trust are mainly due to the invention of the universal welfare state (Rothstein, 2003). 
There is, however, substantial evidence that low-trust and high-trust countries are stable over 
time. Consequently, many third world countries, despite large amounts of development aid, have 
been caged within ‘social traps’ characterized by inequality, low social trust and corruption. 
Meanwhile others, such as the Scandinavian countries, have for decades functioned within a healthy 
circle, characterized by equality, high trust and low levels of corruption (e.g., Uslaner, 2009; 
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Svendsen et al., 2012). One example of the reproduction of trust that can be traced back in history is 
that of Scandinavian immigrants in the United States (see, e.g., Uslaner, 2008). Here, the General 
Social Surveys reveal that Americans with ancestors in Scandinavia still exhibit high levels of trust. 
Hence, it appears that a value such as social trust is transferred from parent to child as a part of 
primary socialization.  
Other examples can be found in a study by Freitag and Traunmüller (2008) showing that 
social trust still prevails in the former Danish provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, as opposed to other 
parts of Germany. Another study by Traunmüller (2011) covering 97 German regions showed the 
trust-enhancing capacity of Protestant religious culture, even when the effects of political 
institutions were controlled for. A study by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) suggests that a possible 
explanation for the differences in trust levels in African countries can be linked to the number of 
slaves that were captured in these countries centuries ago. Finally, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2008) show how differences in trust and norms in Italy can be traced back to medieval institutions. 
Due to these path dependencies, it may be necessary to apply a longue durée approach and 
go back in history to trace the roots of social trust in Scandinavia. As Putnam (1993, p.184) states, 
we may assume that trust-generating institutions are accumulated through long historical processes: 
“Most institutional history moves slowly, [and] history probably moves even more slowly, when 
erecting norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement”. 
A specific and rather overlooked feature of Nordic history is the extensive trade over long 
distances during the Viking age (Sindbæk, 2005). Trade norms associated with social trust and 
trustworthiness arguably play an important role in the economy when facilitating trade, not least in 
non-literate communities. Although some Vikings used the runic alphabet Futhark to write short 
messages, they were largely non-literate until the beginnings of the adoption of Christianity during 
the 10th century (Meulengracht-Sørensen, 2006). 
Regarding trade norms and enforceability, Milgrom et al. (1990) have shown that reputation 
damage of defecting traders was used as an effective social sanctioning practice by medieval 
merchant courts to enforce trust relations in a specific business network. Likewise, Greif (1989, 
1993, 2006) has argued that during the 10th and 11th centuries, the Maghribi, a network of Jewish 
Mediterranean traders, used mostly non-market institutions according to a merchant’s law. This 
practice enforced trustworthiness and prevented freeriding among overseas sales agents belonging 
to the ‘coalition’, as “the legal system failed to provide a framework within which agency relations 
could be organized” (Greif, 1989, p.865). In such cases, however, private-order contract 
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enforcement was supported by a written culture, including formal rules. In the case of the Maghribi, 
the enforcement was supported by letters with additional instructions to overseas agents and, in 
some cases, legal documents.1 
Belief and risk calculation is more important in informal long-distance trade than in local, 
close-distance trade, where specific or bilateral trust towards people known beforehand prevails. In 
informal long-distance trade, social (or generalized) trust thus becomes relevant. Social trust is the 
belief that most people are trustworthy. This belief is related to having faith in strangers and to the 
possibility of the risk of being cheated, for example when strangers meet for the first time in the 
market place (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009, p.12). In other words, as defined by Bohnet (2008), 
trust is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another person’s actions based on beliefs 
about his or her trustworthiness. Such belief reflects a calculation of risk (Williamson, 1993).  
In the following sections, we will focus on the development of trust-based trade norms as 
one possible cause of the accumulation of social trust in Scandinavia. The main question is as 
follows: how did trade norms evolve in Scandinavia? First, in Section 2, we argue that the shift 
from plunder to trade was rational in economic terms and possibly due to ship technology. Next, we 
look at the evolution of long-distance trade in Section 3. In Section 4, we then show how trade 
norms were firmly embedded in a culture of trust where ‘a word is a word’ was legally sanctioned 
by the oral ‘ting’ system and present in trade norms. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 5. Our 
argument is, of course, highly conjectural and should be considered with the appropriate 
reservations. However, we maintain that early long-distance trade by the Vikings could be one of 
the factors behind the high levels of social trust in modern Scandinavia. 
 
2. From plunder to trade 
Scandinavian countries are the oldest existing monarchies in the world. Royal power arose as 
early as 700 AD, and from the 8th to the 11th century, Scandinavians were known as Vikings 
(Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003). Recent research has shown that the centralization of 
political and military power probably took place much earlier, namely, during the 5th and 6th 
centuries (Näsman, 2000). This also helps to explain the highly organized and coordinated nature of 
most Viking fleet raids (e.g., Jensen 2006, p.425-426; Barrett et al., 2000, p.2). 
 
 
                                               
1 See also the discussion on the role of legal enforcement in Edwards and Ogilvie (2012) and Greif (2012). 
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2.1 Switching between two strategies 
A peculiar trait of the Scandinavian Vikings was the switch between two overall strategies, 
namely, plunder and long-distance trade. As historical sources document, the Vikings were better 
than their reputation. The one-sided picture of the terrible Vikings was constructed during the 
Middle Ages and probably also heightened during the Romantic 19th century (Langer, 2002). This is 
the picture that has prevailed ever since. Due to this bad reputation, the Vikings’ skills as long-
distance traders to the economic benefit of themselves and their trading partners have been 
somewhat overlooked (Näsman, 2000; Langer, 2002; Coupland, 2003).2 
Interestingly, historical evidence documents that the profits from Viking raids abroad, as 
measured in silver, declined during the 9th century. Vikings engaging in roving banditry eventually 
saw almost no proﬁts from plundering, due to an increasing number of competitors. Moreover, the 
defenders became better organized in resisting the raids, and approximately around 880 the roving 
days eventually came to an end, as mirrored in the unsuccessful siege of Paris in 885-886 by a 
Danish Viking army (Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003; Sheehan, 2000; Graham-Campbell et 
al., 2011). 
Consequently, one would expect that rational roving Vikings would start looking for more 
profitable options. The strongest Viking rulers with a relative advantage in the use of coercion thus 
had an economic incentive to move to stationary banditry, in which they would increase proﬁts by 
settling down, providing public goods such as safe trading centers and taxing local people rather 
than roving and looting. This pattern is consistent with historical evidence on changes over time in 
the number of raids and the amount of wealth extorted (Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003). The 
shift from plunder to trade and state building can be explained along the lines of the stationary 
bandit model suggested by Olson (1993). Under this model, individual roving bandits are paid to 
alter their behavior when over-plundering eradicates proﬁts. By becoming stationary, they are able 
to exclude others from plundering their local area and begin taxing trade and farmers (ibid.). 
 
2.2 From warrior ships to merchant ships 
Theoretically, plundering basically corresponds to the common-pool problem of ﬁshing or 
hunting from resource economics (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2012). During roving banditry, 
                                               
2 As, for example, Raffield sums it up in the case of Brittany, the Vikings “had a profound effect on British history and 
the development of the English state, the conflict between them and the Anglo-Saxons not only aiding the unification of 
the English under Alfred of Wessex, but also ‘bringing the population into carefully laid out villages’ (Hall, 2007, 
p.104). Furthermore, the Vikings expanded the existing Anglo-Saxon trading network beyond the boundaries of Europe 
to the Far East – a resource that had not been available since the collapse of the Roman Empire” (Raffield, 2009, p.23).  
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confiscating goods from farmers, traders, etc. was a free-access resource that was accessible due to 
the early innovation of the Viking longship (the 8th century langskipu). This ship was equipped with 
a keel as well as a so-called keel pig (kølsvin), a device that effectively locked the mast into the 
keel. The keel, in turn, was connected to a mast fish (mastefisk) placed above deck, which allowed 
the mast to be put down at a moment’s notice. In this way, the enormous pressure on the sails and 
the mast in open sea was spread to the whole ship (Ramskou, 1962; Jensen, 2006). The small keel 
made the longships almost invulnerable to sunken rocks and also enabled them to sail straight onto 
a beach and down shallow rivers. This lean and predatory longship played a crucial role in the raids 
during the 9th century (Roesdahl, 2012, p.95). 
As the strategy gradually changed from plunder to trade, so did the ship type. Hence, the 
longship, or langskipu, became increasingly supplemented with the knarr, a sturdier and shorter 
swan-breasted merchant ship built for trade in the 10th century. These were solidly built ships with 
high freeboards and permanently fixed masts that could carry approximately 24 tons of cargo. As 
has been shown with reconstructed ships, they had excellent sailing skills and were able to 
undertake long journeys in open sea with a relatively high speed (Chartrand et al., 2006; Roesdahl, 
2012, p.99). Overall, the shift from plunder to trade is reflected by the shifting predominance of the 
two ship types mentioned above, namely from the langskipu in the 8th and 9th century to the knarr in 
the 10th and 11th century. The knarr proved to possess the ideal ship technology for long-distance 
trade. 
 
3. Long-distance trade 
In this way, the shift from plunder to trade, as mirrored in the shift from the langskipu to the 
knarr ships, enhanced the peaceful strategy of long-distance trade. Early on, trade in Northern 
Europe had been greatly enhanced by the Muslim invasion of Southern Europe at the beginning of 
the 8th century, which pushed international trade from south to north (Brøndsted, 1960; Ramskou, 
1962).  
 
3.1 Viking trading centers 
In Scandinavian areas, many former Viking military bases were eventually turned into 
important international trading centers that developed during the early Viking Age (8th and 9th 
centuries), as indicated by archaeological findings (Sindbæk, 2007). Among the most important 
‘nodal points’ in this international trade network were Hedeby (Haithabu) and Ribe in Denmark, 
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Kaupang in South Norway, and Åhus and Birka in Sweden. These early Viking Age trading centers 
were secured solely by self-organizing and self-protecting interdependent merchants connected by 
mutual trust (ibid.). 
Trading centers such as these ﬂourished partly due to being fueled by Viking loot (Roesdahl, 
2012) and, as silver findings reveal, trade here increased gradually from the early Viking Age to the 
10th and 11th centuries (Graham-Campbell et al., 2011; Sindbæk, 2005). On the island of Gotland, 
for example, 40,000 Arabic, 38,000 Frankish, and 21,000 Anglo-Saxon silver coins from this period 
have been found (Haywood, 1995). 
That there existed only a few larger central trading-sites should not be taken as an accident 
but rather as an indicator of social trust, as “each participant in a long-distance exchange will have 
had a significant incentive to seek out what he considered the most favorable, safe and active places 
for trading” (Sindbæk 2007, p.128). Moreover, the safety of these central trading places was further 
improved during the 10th century, most probably due to an increasingly more centralized political 
power, as is also revealed by the establishment of military fortifications. 
The southernmost trading center was the abovementioned Haithabu (near Schleswig in 
present North Germany), linking Scandinavia directly to southern trading centers. From 
approximately the year 800 AD onwards, it became an important international trading center due to 
its excellent location at the inlet of the Schlei. All types of ships had easy access to a well-protected, 
calm harbor with direct access to the Baltic Sea and to the Eider river, leading to the North Sea. In 
addition, its proximity to the old Heerweg trading route provided easy access to the Jutland 
peninsula in Denmark, to the Danish islands and, beyond them, to Norway and Sweden (Roesdahl, 
2012, p.132). 
 
3.2 Long-distance trade 
“At the moment that Swedish Vikings were crossing the Caspian Sea on their way to trade in 
Baghdad, Norwegians were sailing down the coast of Labrador looking for suitable land to settle in 
America. The Scandinavians were the first Europeans to have sailed in all of Europe’s seas” 
(Cunliffe, 2008, p.472). 
In Batey et al. (1994, p.79) there is a map with the major routes for long-distance trade from 
Scandinavia, which formed the center of an extensive trading network. The authors state the 
following: “The Vikings’ ocean-going ships gave them command of the seaways of North Western 
Europe, and smaller and lighter craft enabled them to navigate the rivers of central Europe and 
9 
 
Russia to trade with Byzantium and with the tribes who controlled access to the great overland trade 
routes of central Asia. Scandinavia’s raw materials were exchanged for silver and luxury goods: 
silks, spices and honey to flavor their food and wine to wash it down were especially valued, as 
were pottery and glass vessels from the Rhineland, and Frankish swords” (ibid.). Furthermore, Hall 
(2007, p.56) summarizes the long-distance trade strategy in the following way: “Inter-regional or 
international exchange of raw materials or products made by local specialists, in return for goods 
that were not readily available at home, had a long pedigree in Scandinavia. With the capability to 
build bigger and more seaworthy ships came opportunities for Scandinavians to venture further 
afield not only to raid but also to trade”. 
With new ship technology, long-distance trade began to flourish in Scandinavia, leading to 
the beginning of the accumulation of trust: “According to ship-finds, it was only in the tenth century 
that specialized cargo-vessels appeared in Scandinavian waters (…). Before that, trading-ships each 
brought an armed crew for protection. No maintained trade could thrive without a basic trust that 
strangers came with peaceful intentions. But in early Viking Age trading places, the protection of 
peace seems rather to have been provided by the interdependence of the traders than by a coercive 
power” (Sindbæk, 2007, p.128). 
The Vikings were indeed not the only ones to maintain long-distance trade at this time. In 
the Mediterranean, for example, the already mentioned Maghribi Jews also traded safely over 
longer distances. As Avner Greif (1989, 1993, 2006) has shown from medieval trade documents, 
this trade system was facilitated through closed, ethnic networks through which people could send 
formally written letters between synagogues in the trading cities, thus spreading information about 
dishonest behavior. When a merchant did not keep his word, he would be sanctioned formally and 
excluded as a privileged member of the ‘coalition’. Thus, a special feature of the Vikings was that 
they were probably the only ones in Europe at this time who traded across long distances outside a 
closed ethnic network and within an oral culture. Informal rules of the game were simply necessary 
in a largely non-literate culture. Only very few Vikings were able to write and read runes. The 
linear and angular shapes of this alphabet reveal that it was designed to cut short messages easily 
into wood, bone and (later) stone (Hall, 2007). 
The writing of longer formal contracts could not be conducted by means of runes only. For 
this reason alone, this system could not support the formal legal institutions necessary to enforce 
more general contractual rules and thereby support the few people occupied with long-distance 
trade, as in the Roman Empire. Unlike trade in the Mediterranean, the non-literate Vikings required 
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a strong, informal institution to play the same role as formal network relations or a central judiciary 
in written cultures. Informal institutions necessarily imply, on the one hand, a high level of 
‘compensatory’ social trust, i.e., trusting that other people will, in general, behave honestly and 
honorably despite the fact that they may have an immediate, pecuniary incentive to cheat. On the 
other hand, they require effective social sanctions for cases in which trust norms alone do not 
prevent free-riding behavior. 
Even today, mutual trust still plays a role in bilateral trade between countries. Guiso et al. 
(2008) show how Europeans’ trust in each other greatly affects the size of their countries’ trade, 
although Europe today has very strong formal and codified institutions that enforce contract 
maintenance and, hence, trade. In an oral culture where most traders probably did not know each 
other beforehand when trading over a long distance, a high degree of social trust was necessary to 
make it possible for a trader to act outside closed circles. The fact that Vikings did this for centuries 
without relying on formal contracts shows that stable long-distance trade at high volumes is 
arguably an indication of social trust.  
 
 
4. Trade norms and legal system 
4.1 A word is a word 
As shown above, trade norms or informal non-market rules were necessary in non-literate 
cultures where only very few were able to write and read runes. The Viking saying “a word is a 
word” remains in use in current Nordic languages, indicating that if a man breaks his word he no 
longer qualifies to be treated as an equal. Of course, such a saying is not a unique expression only 
used by the Nordic people. We find similar expressions in other languages, for example, Ein Mann, 
ein Wort in German and the corresponding Être un homme de son mot in French, as well as popular 
English phrases such as “A promise made is a debt unpaid” or “Pay your vows”, as it says in the 
Bible. 
The semantic content of ‘a word is a word’ (in Danish and Norwegian Et ord er et ord, in 
Swedish Ett ord är ett ord, in Icelandic Orð er orð, in Faroese Orð eru orð, and in Finnish Sana on 
sana) can be traced fairly far back in Nordic history. The meaning was firmly embedded in a trust 
and honor culture that was probably quite efficient in disciplining people to keep their promises, 
that is, to be trustworthy. Hence, the expression can be found in Old Norse as Orð skulu standa, 
which means “Words shall stand” (in the future form). The meaning of this adage can be traced 
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back to the Jónsbók, an Icelandic law book from 1281 (Jónsbók, 1999). Here we read that svo skal 
hvert orð vera sem mælt er, that is, “So shall every word be, as it is spoken”. This is a concrete and 
binding formulation of what in many modern languages is expressed as “one should stand by one’s 
word”.3 
Notably, the word orð in the Old Nordic language also meant loforð, which means ‘promise 
word’, i.e., promise. Hence, “Words shall stand” becomes identical with “Promises are to be kept”, 
and the essential meaning of “A word is a word” then becomes, also in a purely etymological sense, 
“A promise is a promise”. Later on, in a letter from 1518, the quote from the Jónsbók is 
reformulated as “thus every word shall stand, as it is spoken”, að svo skuli hvert orð standa sem 
talað er, giving life to the expression orð skulu standa.4 In other words, when something is said, it 
has in principle already been performed. Words and deeds are de facto the same.  
 
4.2 Man’s honor 
The non-literate Viking communities were permeated by an ideology prescribing 
trustworthiness and ‘Man’s honor’. Indeed, the Vikings seem to have been so monomaniacal in 
accumulating symbolic capital such as honor and recognition that herding material forms of capital 
(for example silver) through plundering or trade appears utterly senseless, except if used as a tool to 
increase a person’s honor, i.e., his symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). 
The Old Norse word for “honor” (virðing or mannvirðing) means honor, reputation, respect 
and credit. That is, to be a man of honor expressed immediate credibility and hence access to credit, 
for example, trade credit. In other words, men of honor enjoyed a great deal of trust and credit 
worthiness. As such, a ‘Man’s honor’ represented a valuable form of capital for the Vikings and it 
was both rational and profitable to accumulate this form of symbolic capital. The importance of 
virðing is also revealed in the many synonyms for honor, including sæmð and vegr, the latter word 
also meaning road, direction, and journey. In summary, symbolic capital in the form of a person’s 
honor, trustworthiness and credibility seems to have been the master form of capital in Viking times 
– the capital that gives access to all other forms of capital. 
                                               
3 In contemporary Icelandic: Maður verður að standa við orð sín, ‘you must stick to your word’. 
4 This rule of conduct was still taught as the “Eleventh Commandment” in Iceland in the middle of the 19th century 
(Sigurdsson, 2004). Here we find the same congruence between the speech act and the future actions a person has 
promised. This suggests that the person making the promise was fully aware that if he did not keep his promise (e.g., 
paying 10 silver coins for a good), he would break the natural unity between the outspoken promise, in the old Nordic 
language literally ‘promising words’ (loforð), and the future act. 
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Moreover, reading historical sources, the frequency of the word “honor” in Viking society is 
baffling, especially taking into consideration that the word honor (virðing), as well as its modern 
equivalents like ære and hæder in Danish or ära and heder in Swedish, has more or less 
disappeared from Scandinavian everyday languages, perhaps indicating a historical devaluation of 
symbolic capital. Honor, which included keeping one’s word, winning in battles and not lying to 
anybody under any circumstances, acted as a form of intangible symbolic capital that – as 
mentioned – was probably considered much more valuable than tangible material wealth, such as 
precious metals and property. This is evident, for example, in a famous Viking Age history of early 
Danish heroes and kings dating back approximately to the year 1200 AD, entitled Gesta Danorum 
(Deeds of the Danes) and written by a clerk, Saxo. In this work, ‘honor’ is mentioned 286 times, 
reflecting the worldview that a man should “not desire blinking precious metals but glorious 
victory; better to strive after glory and honor than after gold and property”. In this historical work, 
uttered words are de facto future acts, and honor counts a thousand times more than material wealth 
– even more than life itself, as nothing compares to an ‘honorable death’ (Saxo, 1187). A similar 
honor codex can be found in many of the sagas, for example in verse 75 of the Eddaic Hávamál, 
which dates back to the 10th or 9th century: “Cattle die, Kinsmen die, and I – I die myself. But there 
is one thing that will never die: An honorable and well-earned fame”. 
 
4.3 The Thing system 
The Thing is sometimes referred to as the cradle of Nordic democracies. A Thing/Ting 
(Icelandic/old Norse: Þing; English: Thing, German: Ding) was an assembly of free men who met 
regularly at specific Thing places (in English “thingsteads”).5 It is another indicator of trust-based 
norms in the non-literate Viking world by assuring the sanctioning of law-breakers without the use 
of one single written document. Thing meetings were typically led by the local chief and a law-
speaker (lovsigemand), i.e., a judge who recited laws from memory, as they were not codified. It 
was based on ‘truth words’ (sandeord) from ‘truth men’ (sandemænd), i.e., truthful, righteous, 
honest men who speak the truth (Thing Project, 2016). 
The oral Thing was part of a hierarchy of local, regional and national systems.6 It was used 
to settle disputes based on oral discussions. It was also a place where political decisions were taken, 
                                               
5 That only men went to tinge (to the Thing) does not mean that women were considered lower beings than men. In fact, 
all sources indicate that women and men were largely equal (Sørensen, 1990, p.32).  
6 National Things exist to this day in the Nordic countries, such as the Icelandic parliament (Alþingi), the Norwegian 
Storting, the Landsting in Greenland, the Faroese Løgting, the Danish Folketing and the Manx parliament (Tynwald) on 
the Isle of Man, considered the world’s oldest working parliament (over 1000 years in an unbroken period). 
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including the election of chiefs and kings. In certain places it was even used for religious 
ceremonies and as a center for defense forces. Anyone could submit a complaint. All punishments, 
such as fines, beheading or outlawry, were decided after a discussion and free men had the right to 
vote. The Vikings brought the Thing system to many locations in Northern Europe. Examples 
include Gulating, north of Bergen (Norway), Haugating in Tonsberg (Norway), Albingi Thingvellir 
(Þingvellir) east of Reykjavik, and Tingvalla at Karlstad, in Sweden. There were also Things in 
places such as Viborg, Lund and Ringsted in the Danish kingdom, the Thing Wall of Shetland and 
the Orkneys, the Tinganes in Torshavn, the Thing in Gulde in Angel east of Flensburg and Fingay 
Hill in Yorkshire, England (ibid.).  
 
4.4 Honesty in trade 
Finally, subsequent written sources on trade norms also indicate that the Vikings simply felt 
that it pays to be honest. We here refer to a Norwegian text from 1240 AD entitled The Vikings’ 
Guide to Business Success (from Konungs skuggsjá: The King’s Mirror, i.e., a ’mirror of society’). 
The guide teaches honesty, reliability and respect for other people out of sheer self-interest and 
reputation building rather than altruism. The text, for example, refers to the following: “It is often 
the best men who choose this occupation [trade]. But whether you choose to resemble those who 
really are tradesmen or those who just call themselves tradesmen but who are, rather, hucksters and 
swindlers who buy and sell in a dishonest way, has a lot to say” (Vikings’ Guide 1997, p.11, our 
translation). Such trade norms urging to keep ones’ promise are still maintained and present in 
Danish legislative practices (Lookofsky, 2008). 
 
5. Conclusion 
It remains quite unclear how the observed high level of social trust in the Scandinavian 
countries came into being. Focusing on the peculiar Scandinavian trait of long-distance trade in a 
longue durée approach, our research question was as follows: how did trade norms evolve in 
Scandinavia? 
First, we argued that a rational economic shift in strategy from plunder to long-distance trade 
occurred among Scandinavian Vikings. Thus, in approximately 880 AD, the ‘good old’ roving days 
came to an end and were gradually substituted by strong trade norms during the 10th and 11th 
centuries. This was mirrored in the shift from the predatory longship to the knarr cargo carrier, 
enhancing the peaceful strategy of long-distance trade. 
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Next, we argued that these trade norms were connected to social trust out of necessity in an 
oral culture where not all traders knew each other in advance in open networks. For a non-literate 
culture, this meant that if a trader did not keep his word, he would be socially sanctioned by earning 
a bad reputation. It would then be harder for the ‘cheater’ to carry out future trade, and this effect 
would discipline behavior and prevent free-riding. Thus, the trade norm of keeping one’s promises 
can be efficiently maintained when socially sanctioned. 
We suggested that the existence of extensive long-distance trading indicates high levels of 
‘compensatory’ social trust in the predominantly oral Viking world. These informal institutions are 
probably necessary in the absence of formal networks of information, such as written documents 
that, for example, supported medieval trade across the Mediterranean (cf. Greif, 1989). Finally, we 
argued that the Scandinavian trust culture was reflected in the ideology of a ‘Man’s honor’, the oral 
Thing system and trade norms as revealed in later written sources. 
Viewed in this light, the relative socio-economic success of the Scandinavian welfare state 
may be traced in a path-dependent historical process, the root of which may be long-distance trade 
and the rise of a trust culture in the late Viking age (10th and 11th centuries). This could explain in 
part why Scandinavian countries today enjoy high levels of trust that have insulated these nations 
from non-cooperative behavior and free-riding. 
As the saying goes, “it takes years to build up trust and only seconds to destroy it.” Surely, it 
should not have to take one thousand years to build up a trust culture where ‘a word is a word’. 
How is it possible to speed up the otherwise slow process of social trust accumulation? One policy 
option in nations and regions lacking social trust would be to identify and cultivate cooperative 
norms in their own history, so as to found just and non-corrupt state institutions upon such norms— 
what Putnam terms “cultural templates” (Putnam, 1993). Another policy option would be to 
eliminate all sorts of trade restrictions, for example between Europe and Africa. More free trade 
would in itself increase economic growth, but on top of that, social trust would arguably be 
strengthened too. Coining such a ‘double dividend’ could significantly contribute to long-run socio-
economic benefits in both developed and developing countries, especially where non-literacy 
prevails. 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank the editors and reviewers for constructive comments. 
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